Lexington, Ky. (March 19, 2024)  - In February, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck a blow to legislators' attempts to extend the statute of limitations applicable to child sexual abuse claims against third parties such as schools, government employers, or churches.

Despite the Kentucky legislature's passage of amendments in 2017 and 2021 that would have tolled the time to bring a third-party claim (based upon the third party's negligence in regards to the abuse), the state's highest court has now ruled that these third party defendants have a vested right to a statute of limitations defense.

A recent Kentucky Supreme Court case, Thompson v. Killary, examined this very issue. In Thompson, the plaintiff, Killary, alleged she endured years of sexual abuse at the hands of her adoptive father (who was employed as a police officer). In her suit, which was filed in 2018, the plaintiff further alleged that various other persons and entities played a role in her abuse, including her father's employer, the Louisville Metro Police Department.

The year before Killary's suit was filed, the Kentucky state legislature doubled the time period in which a plaintiff could sue under KRS 213.249, amended the tolling period from five years to 10 years, and also added a new triggering event - the conviction of the abuser. It was this triggering condition, the conviction of Killary's father in 2018, that subsequently revived the plaintiff's otherwise time-barred claims against the police department and other third parties that Killary claimed knew of the abuse.

In 2021, while Killary's suit was still ongoing, KRS 213.249 was again amended, permitting suits against third parties, and also expressly made the 2017 version of the statute retroactive. This seemingly provided for revival of all previously time-barred claims for childhood sexual abuse, including those against third parties.

The Supreme Court in Thompson, however, recently held that reviving a time-barred claim has "long conflicted with federal authority" and that the statute of limitations is "a vested right beyond legislative control." The court also noted that “no statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” Therefore, the court found that the plaintiff's cause of action against her father's employer, the police department, was indeed barred by the statute of limitations.

Therefore, the ruling in Thompson attempts to limit the exposure of a third party, such as a church, state actor, or educational entity, that could potentially face liability under KRS 213.249.

While the amendments to KRS 213.249 of 2017 and 2021 seem to have expanded the liability potentially facing these entities, the holding in Thompson shows the Supreme Court electing to preserve the right of third-party defendants to defend themselves if they have a vested right of defense based upon the statute of limitations. This is especially true in instances where the amendments to KRS 213.249 in 2017 and 2021 appeared to subsequently revive otherwise time-barred claims.

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